What's the chances of the power outages and airport problems being cyber attacks. Is that possible. I would think so ?
Gary
Harry Macdonald:
. . . It must be possible to design a battery inverter system that mimics the response of a rotating plant in terms of output vs frequency and, given that most conventional plant can run at 110% of rated output for an hour or so, the battery capacity could be designed on the same basis, I.e. 10% of the local wind or solar generator.
Harry Macdonald:
I suspect it isn't as simple as Broadgage reports since the need for load shedding isn't just based on load / frequency issues. Transmission line outages can mean load shedding is needed when the generation is adequate.
National Grid is routinely restricting the use of its own power cables from the Continent because of the risk of blackouts if they failed. Britain’s electricity system is sufficiently fragile at certain times of day that if one of the subsea “interconnectors” tripped while importing at full capacity, it could trigger power cuts like those on August 9th.
A senior National Grid source told The Times that for several years it had been managing this risk by limiting the use of the cables at these times, especially overnight, so as to reduce the size of the potential supply shock.
They said that the costs of doing so, which are understood to run to many millions of pounds, were cheaper than paying for enough back-up to withstand a potential failure.The disclosure of the arrangement, described by one analyst as “perverse”, raises questions over how National Grid manages supplies and over its plans to spend billions of pounds building more interconnectors.National Grid is a FTSE 100 group with annual profits of £1.8 billion, primarily from running regulated networks in Britain and the United States. In the UK it is also the system operator, entrusted with keeping the lights on, and is under intense scrutiny after blackouts on August 9 cut off a million homes and caused chaos on rail networks. These have been blamed on the simultaneous failure of a large wind farm and gas plant.
National Grid also has a commercial division that co-owns three interconnectors and is investing billions of pounds building several more. It makes money by selling traders the right to use the cables to import or export power. However, the company’s control room, a legally separate part of the business, then often has to pay traders not to use the cables after all, because of the blackout risk if the cables failed. These payments ultimately are funded by consumers on their energy bills.
National Grid’s control room aims to ensure that the system can withstand the sudden loss of the largest single source of electricity at any given time by procuring rapid-response back-up plants. Overnight, when demand is low and many big power stations are not running, the biggest single risk often comes from the subsea power cables.The system is particularly fragile at these times because, unlike traditional power plants, neither interconnectors nor wind farms provide “inertia”, or resistance to the change in the frequency on the grid. That means frequency tends to be more volatile.If frequency drops very rapidly, as it did on August 9, there may not be enough time for back-up plants to start up before it gets dangerously low. A rapid drop also can make other plants trip off, exacerbating the problem.
One analyst, who asked not to be named, said: “If a large interconnector trips there will be little other generation on the system providing inertia to control the rate of change of frequency, so an event like that Friday blackout becomes likely.”
The National Grid source said it was “cheaper to pull back the interconnectors than it is to buy the frequency response to cover a larger loss”.
However, another senior industry figure questioned the arrangement, saying: “They are selling capacity and letting the market buy energy from Europe which they know won’t be able to be imported, then they have to pay to restrict it. The end consumer loses.”
National Grid’s interconnectors to Belgium and the Netherlands are each of one gigawatt capacity, while its link to France is two gigawatts but is treated as two separate one gigawatt cables. It is understood that the control room typically restricts each cable to about 700 megawatts at times of low inertia.
National Grid is building another one gigawatt link to France, a 1.4 gigawatt link to Denmark and a 1.4 gigawatt link to Norway. This raises the prospect that consumers will have to pay to restrict further capacity that its commercial business sells to traders but its control room decides cannot safely be used. It is understood that the alternative would be to invest in other ways of providing inertia to stabilise the system.
National Grid declined to say how much it was spending on restricting its interconnectors. A spokesman said that they “play an important role in securing a more resilient energy network”. The National Grid system operator said that it “aims to manage the GB electricity network safely and efficiently, keeping costs down and consumer bills to a minimum. All actions we take to balance supply and demand contribute to this.”
A senior National Grid source told The Times that for several years it had been managing this risk by limiting the use of the cables at these times, especially overnight, so as to reduce the size of the potential supply shock.They said that the costs of doing so, which are understood to run to many millions of pounds, were cheaper than paying for enough back-up to withstand a potential failure.The disclosure of the arrangement, described by one analyst as “perverse”, raises questions over how National Grid manages supplies and over its plans to spend billions of pounds building more interconnectors.
National Grid is a FTSE 100 group with annual profits of £1.8 billion, primarily from running regulated networks in Britain and the United States. In the UK it is also the system operator, entrusted with keeping the lights on, and is under intense scrutiny after blackouts on August 9 cut off a million homes and caused chaos on rail networks. These have been blamed on the simultaneous failure of a large wind farm and gas plant. National Grid also has a commercial division that co-owns three interconnectors and is investing billions of pounds building several more. It makes money by selling traders the right to use the cables to import or export power. However, the company’s control room, a legally separate part of the business, then often has to pay traders not to use the cables after all, because of the blackout risk if the cables failed. These payments ultimately are funded by consumers on their energy bills.
National Grid’s control room aims to ensure that the system can withstand the sudden loss of the largest single source of electricity at any given time by procuring rapid-response back-up plants. Overnight, when demand is low and many big power stations are not running, the biggest single risk often comes from the subsea power cables.The system is particularly fragile at these times because, unlike traditional power plants, neither interconnectors nor wind farms provide “inertia”, or resistance to the change in the frequency on the grid. That means frequency tends to be more volatile.If frequency drops very rapidly, as it did on August 9, there may not be enough time for back-up plants to start up before it gets dangerously low. A rapid drop also can make other plants trip off, exacerbating the problem.
One analyst, who asked not to be named, said: “If a large interconnector trips there will be little other generation on the system providing inertia to control the rate of change of frequency, so an event like that Friday blackout becomes likely.”
The National Grid source said it was “cheaper to pull back the interconnectors than it is to buy the frequency response to cover a larger loss”.
However, another senior industry figure questioned the arrangement, saying: “They are selling capacity and letting the market buy energy from Europe which they know won’t be able to be imported, then they have to pay to restrict it. The end consumer loses.”
National Grid’s interconnectors to Belgium and the Netherlands are each of one gigawatt capacity, while its link to France is two gigawatts but is treated as two separate one gigawatt cables. It is understood that the control room typically restricts each cable to about 700 megawatts at times of low inertia. National Grid is building another one gigawatt link to France, a 1.4 gigawatt link to Denmark and a 1.4 gigawatt link to Norway. This raises the prospect that consumers will have to pay to restrict further capacity that its commercial business sells to traders but its control room decides cannot safely be used. It is understood that the alternative would be to invest in other ways of providing inertia to stabilise the system.
National Grid declined to say how much it was spending on restricting its interconnectors. A spokesman said that they “play an important role in securing a more resilient energy network”. The National Grid system operator said that it “aims to manage the GB electricity network safely and efficiently, keeping costs down and consumer bills to a minimum. All actions we take to balance supply and demand contribute to this.”
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