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Driverless Trains

The March 2017 Issue of E&T carries several articles about driverless cars but why haven't we got driverless mainline trains?


The technical 'problem' should be far simpler to solve than for a road vehicle. The position on the 'road' can be predicted and determined easily with precision. There is essentially no collision problem to solve, that has been done with the existing signalling system.


There is no need for communication with the train, no need for additional infrastructure. All that is needed is to observe and act on the existing fixed signals.


Of course such a basic system can be improved upon to produce a 'super driver' capable of reacting to unplanned obstructions, greasy rails etc.


The human driver is perhaps the last link to be made 'fail-safe' in the railway safety regime. Our efforts to 'improve' the driver-train interface have probably added new problems. Regular signal spacings, standard aspects and driver alerts must surely increase the boredom and inattention factor. An example of this was the Shap Roll-back in August 2010 where a driver correctly observed adverse signals, came to a stop, then allowed the train to roll-back, acknowledging the retreating adverse signals on the way, until the train exceeded 50 mph. Presumably he was half asleep?


I suspect the real 'problem' is a social one, it will be a tragedy if we can't solve that one.

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  • Gareth Wood:



    Hi Andy, you quote 10^14 for track circuits. Do you have reference for that figure please. Just been in an argument with other people over removal of track circuits vs. unproven GPS location system.  This would be helpful. Thanks. If you don't mind I will join the conversation below.

     




    Hi Gareth,


    That was a bit naughty of me as I don't usually quote figures I can't publicly back up! If you look on my LinkedIn profile it won't take a lot of detective work to work out where that figure came from smiley but as it isn't (afaik) published by Network Rail or Bombardier I'd better not go much further. And I may be an order of magnitude or two out (I wrote it from memory), but it's of around that order.


    The bottom line is that I don't think there is any serious argument that a modern track circuit has any direct safety concerns whatsoever. There is a far more interesting discussion about the indirect risks due to reliability issues with track circuits, which then results in degredation to manual signalling which is phenomenally dangerous. Track circuit reliability can be vastly improved with condition monitoring, allowing pre-detection of failure conditions, but again it's a matter of expense. Maybe if a fatal accident occurs in degraded manual signalling mode which could have been prevented if (root cause) the track circuit had been readjusted / track connections repaired there will be more drive for this. 


    There was a very interesting IRSE presentation on Tuesday night by Network Rail & ProRail. This was explaining the possibility of a "hybrid" system running ETCS level 3 but with the existing block sections in place. Practically this could mean that the system could run level 3 (including autonomous!) trains interleaved with non-ETCS trains. It's just that there would be the existing large headway between the level 3 trains and unequipped trains. Very interesting for routes which mostly run fixed formation passenger stock with occasional freight trains. I'll be watching with interest.


    Kind regards,


    Andy 


Reply

  • Gareth Wood:



    Hi Andy, you quote 10^14 for track circuits. Do you have reference for that figure please. Just been in an argument with other people over removal of track circuits vs. unproven GPS location system.  This would be helpful. Thanks. If you don't mind I will join the conversation below.

     




    Hi Gareth,


    That was a bit naughty of me as I don't usually quote figures I can't publicly back up! If you look on my LinkedIn profile it won't take a lot of detective work to work out where that figure came from smiley but as it isn't (afaik) published by Network Rail or Bombardier I'd better not go much further. And I may be an order of magnitude or two out (I wrote it from memory), but it's of around that order.


    The bottom line is that I don't think there is any serious argument that a modern track circuit has any direct safety concerns whatsoever. There is a far more interesting discussion about the indirect risks due to reliability issues with track circuits, which then results in degredation to manual signalling which is phenomenally dangerous. Track circuit reliability can be vastly improved with condition monitoring, allowing pre-detection of failure conditions, but again it's a matter of expense. Maybe if a fatal accident occurs in degraded manual signalling mode which could have been prevented if (root cause) the track circuit had been readjusted / track connections repaired there will be more drive for this. 


    There was a very interesting IRSE presentation on Tuesday night by Network Rail & ProRail. This was explaining the possibility of a "hybrid" system running ETCS level 3 but with the existing block sections in place. Practically this could mean that the system could run level 3 (including autonomous!) trains interleaved with non-ETCS trains. It's just that there would be the existing large headway between the level 3 trains and unequipped trains. Very interesting for routes which mostly run fixed formation passenger stock with occasional freight trains. I'll be watching with interest.


    Kind regards,


    Andy 


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