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Time for licenced Engineers?

Former Community Member
Former Community Member
As a result of a discussion within a Linkedin group. I had originally raised the issue of the EC UK or IET legally licencing Engineers and had agreed to bring this discussion from Linkedin to the IET members in an appropriate community for a frank and open debate.

​The circumstances surrounding this discussion was the tragedy of Grenfell Towers and my personal observation that some of the alleged decision makers, had no technical qualifications to make decisions on public safety. I am wondering how far the inquiry will go to reveal that issue. 



As I currently work in Canada we do have an act of law governing the conduct of its licenced Engineers and this makes the Engineer have some higher degree of responsibility for public safety.


​Questions

1)    Given the impact of Grenfell, does EC(UK) have to now start considering licencing? What are the perceived hurdles to achieve this?

​2)    If not. What can we do within our profession to improve pubic safety with an objective to prevent another 'Grenfell' ?


I am ​Interested to get IET members responses.

Parents
  • Hi,


    Actually I disagree with a connection between public perception and a drive for legal change - I would hope that any change in the law would be driven by a proven opportunity to improve safety by licensing rather than by a public perception that it would improve? (I think for example of the original dangerous dogs act, IMHO a daft piece of legislation that was driven by a false public perception of risk and risk management.)


    My personal feeling is that, as Roy describes, there are already legal remedies - including, now, personal liability - against negligence on the part of both employers and employees which covers this issue: including the risk that employers employ incompetent engineers. The rail industry has been mentioned above, it is true that for certain defined implementation actions licensing is in place, but for the vast majority of change activities there are no licensing requirements, but there is clear legislation that safety cases must be in place which include demonstration of staff competence. So people like me go and look at the staff involved to make sure they are competent in their specific roles. Which we'd have to do even if they were licensed as a general purpose engineer.


    I'm not against licensing in principle, and for defined processes (like rail signalling systems as mentioned, Gas Safe, Part P) where there are nice clear boundaries and competence requirements I think it's a very good idea. But I've never yet seen a quantified argument that it will support safety if it is applied as a generic process - however that's not to say such an argument doesn't exist!


    I'd be very, very wary about drawing conclusions about Grenfell Tower until the public enquiry concludes, but there seems a strong possibility that the building regulations may have been followed to the letter, in which case the engineers involved in the tower design would have been acting perfectly competently (we don't know yet) - certainly if this was the case it would be hard to delicence a licenced engineer for following the statutory regulations! It is well worth reading the interim report on the building regulations review following the fire:

    www.gov.uk/.../Independent_Review_of_Building_Regulations_and_Fire_Safety_web_accessible.pdf

    It's very interesting that this broadly recommends moving away from a regulations based approach to a risk-based approach (as we use in the rail industry). I've pasted the detail recommendations regarding competence below - note that the onus is passed to professional bodies! 


    Cheers, Andy

     

    1.72

    The task of raising levels of competence and establishing formal accreditation of those engaged at every stage of design, construction, inspection and maintenance of complex and high-risk buildings can and should be led by those professional bodies which cover the sector. The system needs to be designed to ensure that competence is measured, is made transparent to those engaging the individuals and has a means of recourse in the event that work delivered is substandard. This is a challenge to the current less rigorous and disjointed approach to registration or certification which allows many individuals to practice with questionable qualifications or without a requirement for competence to be assessed and accredited.


    1.73

    Recommendation: There is a need to be certain that those working on the design, construction, inspection and maintenance of complex and high-risk buildings are suitably qualified. The professional and accreditation bodies have an opportunity to demonstrate that they are capable of establishing a robust, comprehensive and coherent system covering all disciplines for work on such buildings. If they are able to come together and develop a joined up system covering all levels of qualification in relevant disciplines, this will provide the framework for regulation to mandate the use of suitable, qualified professionals who can demonstrate that their skills are up to date. This should cover as a minimum:

    • engineers;

    • those installing and maintaining fire safety systems and other safety-critical systems;

    • fire engineers;

    • fire risk assessors;

    • fire safety enforcing officers; and

    • building control inspectors.

    I would ask these bodies to work together now to propose such a system as soon as practicable.

    I will launch this work at a summit in early 2018.



Reply
  • Hi,


    Actually I disagree with a connection between public perception and a drive for legal change - I would hope that any change in the law would be driven by a proven opportunity to improve safety by licensing rather than by a public perception that it would improve? (I think for example of the original dangerous dogs act, IMHO a daft piece of legislation that was driven by a false public perception of risk and risk management.)


    My personal feeling is that, as Roy describes, there are already legal remedies - including, now, personal liability - against negligence on the part of both employers and employees which covers this issue: including the risk that employers employ incompetent engineers. The rail industry has been mentioned above, it is true that for certain defined implementation actions licensing is in place, but for the vast majority of change activities there are no licensing requirements, but there is clear legislation that safety cases must be in place which include demonstration of staff competence. So people like me go and look at the staff involved to make sure they are competent in their specific roles. Which we'd have to do even if they were licensed as a general purpose engineer.


    I'm not against licensing in principle, and for defined processes (like rail signalling systems as mentioned, Gas Safe, Part P) where there are nice clear boundaries and competence requirements I think it's a very good idea. But I've never yet seen a quantified argument that it will support safety if it is applied as a generic process - however that's not to say such an argument doesn't exist!


    I'd be very, very wary about drawing conclusions about Grenfell Tower until the public enquiry concludes, but there seems a strong possibility that the building regulations may have been followed to the letter, in which case the engineers involved in the tower design would have been acting perfectly competently (we don't know yet) - certainly if this was the case it would be hard to delicence a licenced engineer for following the statutory regulations! It is well worth reading the interim report on the building regulations review following the fire:

    www.gov.uk/.../Independent_Review_of_Building_Regulations_and_Fire_Safety_web_accessible.pdf

    It's very interesting that this broadly recommends moving away from a regulations based approach to a risk-based approach (as we use in the rail industry). I've pasted the detail recommendations regarding competence below - note that the onus is passed to professional bodies! 


    Cheers, Andy

     

    1.72

    The task of raising levels of competence and establishing formal accreditation of those engaged at every stage of design, construction, inspection and maintenance of complex and high-risk buildings can and should be led by those professional bodies which cover the sector. The system needs to be designed to ensure that competence is measured, is made transparent to those engaging the individuals and has a means of recourse in the event that work delivered is substandard. This is a challenge to the current less rigorous and disjointed approach to registration or certification which allows many individuals to practice with questionable qualifications or without a requirement for competence to be assessed and accredited.


    1.73

    Recommendation: There is a need to be certain that those working on the design, construction, inspection and maintenance of complex and high-risk buildings are suitably qualified. The professional and accreditation bodies have an opportunity to demonstrate that they are capable of establishing a robust, comprehensive and coherent system covering all disciplines for work on such buildings. If they are able to come together and develop a joined up system covering all levels of qualification in relevant disciplines, this will provide the framework for regulation to mandate the use of suitable, qualified professionals who can demonstrate that their skills are up to date. This should cover as a minimum:

    • engineers;

    • those installing and maintaining fire safety systems and other safety-critical systems;

    • fire engineers;

    • fire risk assessors;

    • fire safety enforcing officers; and

    • building control inspectors.

    I would ask these bodies to work together now to propose such a system as soon as practicable.

    I will launch this work at a summit in early 2018.



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