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Signalling power supplies into Victoria Station

Former Community Member
Former Community Member

I'm not entirely familiar with UK railway power supply engineering, but how is it possible to

a) entirely lose the power to more than one signalling "unit" (e.g. in the Streatham Common area) 

b) and then take a full 24 hours to fix it?

Does anyone know the relevant standards, or any details of the fault?

Ian

 
Parents
  • Hi Ian,


    I'm sure there are people here who do, but this is a public forum so it would be inappropriate (and probably in breach of their contracts of employment) for them to post here. It is a challenge for these forums that those who do know the answers to complex issues are often not in a position to discuss them. It's a nice idea, "let's have a forum for engineers to share ideas and improve the world", but most of the stuff we do as a day job - and hence have real expertise in - we really can't discuss here. Ideas welcome as to how we solve that. (You'll notice that - except on the Wiring Regs forum - mostly when anyone posts a "does anybody know?" question the only replies are from those who start "it's not my field, but...") 


    And this is an extreme case - if I knew how to bring down a large proportion of London's railways by generating a single failure, and I posted it on an open forum, I suspect several people in long overcoats would be paying me a visit!! Quite reasonably. Also, of course, there are rather more professional ways that I should be notifying and working with the relevant bodies.


    In this case, having worked in the UK rail industry for 25 years I can be pretty confident that an awful lot of people will be spending an awful lot of time trying to make sure that (as far as possible) this doesn't happen again. What happens in practice, which works reasonably well, is that the infrastructure owner (presumably Network Rail in this case) works with the relevant suppliers of this and any similar equipment to ensure that it doesn't happen again. Been there, done that, in a past life I was regularly on the receiving end of those visits: "your competitors' products failed like this, how can we be sure that yours won't fail in the same way?"


    In theory there is an interesting general point here: when an accident occurs on the railways the results of the investigation are made public, but when a major availability failure occurs the results are not. Which does miss the advantage of letting new suppliers offer innovative solutions to prevent reoccurrence (which I guess was the point of your post). However, it's a fine balance. If you publicly report exact equipment and system failures, and hence give competitors an advantage, then equipment and system suppliers will consider whether this is really a market they want to enter - and it's hard enough getting them to enter it as it is due to the very high technical standards (relative to cost) expected. Any thought of how other industries manage this which the rail industry could learn from?


    Finally, of course, what the newspapers report relating to engineering failure tends to be grossly oversimplified. And equally, absolutely nothing to do with a signalling system is ever simple. So personally I reserve speculation until I hear the facts. (And when I do know the facts I usually then can't discuss them. D'oh.)


    Sorry if that all come across as a bit bland. Oddly enough, despite spending Thursday travelling into, across, and out of London I seemed to be the one person not affected by any of the various delays! (This was only one of several things that went wrong that day.) But I saw plenty of the side effects, and fully agree that we don't want it to happen again. 


    Interesting point,


    Cheers,


    Andy

    Independent Safety Assessor (rail) / MIRSE

Reply
  • Hi Ian,


    I'm sure there are people here who do, but this is a public forum so it would be inappropriate (and probably in breach of their contracts of employment) for them to post here. It is a challenge for these forums that those who do know the answers to complex issues are often not in a position to discuss them. It's a nice idea, "let's have a forum for engineers to share ideas and improve the world", but most of the stuff we do as a day job - and hence have real expertise in - we really can't discuss here. Ideas welcome as to how we solve that. (You'll notice that - except on the Wiring Regs forum - mostly when anyone posts a "does anybody know?" question the only replies are from those who start "it's not my field, but...") 


    And this is an extreme case - if I knew how to bring down a large proportion of London's railways by generating a single failure, and I posted it on an open forum, I suspect several people in long overcoats would be paying me a visit!! Quite reasonably. Also, of course, there are rather more professional ways that I should be notifying and working with the relevant bodies.


    In this case, having worked in the UK rail industry for 25 years I can be pretty confident that an awful lot of people will be spending an awful lot of time trying to make sure that (as far as possible) this doesn't happen again. What happens in practice, which works reasonably well, is that the infrastructure owner (presumably Network Rail in this case) works with the relevant suppliers of this and any similar equipment to ensure that it doesn't happen again. Been there, done that, in a past life I was regularly on the receiving end of those visits: "your competitors' products failed like this, how can we be sure that yours won't fail in the same way?"


    In theory there is an interesting general point here: when an accident occurs on the railways the results of the investigation are made public, but when a major availability failure occurs the results are not. Which does miss the advantage of letting new suppliers offer innovative solutions to prevent reoccurrence (which I guess was the point of your post). However, it's a fine balance. If you publicly report exact equipment and system failures, and hence give competitors an advantage, then equipment and system suppliers will consider whether this is really a market they want to enter - and it's hard enough getting them to enter it as it is due to the very high technical standards (relative to cost) expected. Any thought of how other industries manage this which the rail industry could learn from?


    Finally, of course, what the newspapers report relating to engineering failure tends to be grossly oversimplified. And equally, absolutely nothing to do with a signalling system is ever simple. So personally I reserve speculation until I hear the facts. (And when I do know the facts I usually then can't discuss them. D'oh.)


    Sorry if that all come across as a bit bland. Oddly enough, despite spending Thursday travelling into, across, and out of London I seemed to be the one person not affected by any of the various delays! (This was only one of several things that went wrong that day.) But I saw plenty of the side effects, and fully agree that we don't want it to happen again. 


    Interesting point,


    Cheers,


    Andy

    Independent Safety Assessor (rail) / MIRSE

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