Alastair,


Sounds like a classic failure in the systems design thinking, less than rigorous risk management, perhaps an element of group think and not enough challenging within the team, a fundamental poor assumption that only one power ring system could never have a fault/failure (all systems fail), no power distribution redundancy, or a single point of failure, a weakness in the Fault Tree Analysis methodology, and perhaps some limited 'thinking the unthinkable'.


Could have been overcome, or minimised at least, with some robust, or better, Failure Mode, Effects & Criticality Analysis (FMECA) quantitative failure analysis. The FMECA involves creating a series of linkages between potential failures (Failure Modes), the impact on the mission (Effects) and the causes of the failure (Causes and Mechanisms) - some basic 'what if this fails or malfunctions' questioning of every element of a system hardware and software.


One could argue this lack of system fault analysis was why the Royal Navy Type 45 Destroyers had such an expensive and alongside period due to the well documented power/cooling/propulsion problem still being resolved. The more complex and too software reliant a design, the more vulnerable and likely to have failures and faults. Need to get back to the KISS (Keep It Simple and Safe) principle, especially to provide robust, basic failsafe, minimum functionality operating capability in high risk environments. 


Fortunately, in your scenario you had a chief engineer and technical team who could do proper engineering and fault circumvention. Unfortunately, as many organisations down-skill and rely more on out-sourcing of key engineering and technical skills, and greater reliance on HUMS and automated fault analysis and reporting systems, the basic engineering skills needed in these critical scenarios are rapidly fading and being lost with the retirement of the older workforce. Time for re-introduction second and third line engineering and maintenance skills, especially when operating in remote and isolated scenarios where it is impossible or difficult to bring in SMEs, or rely on robust tele-maintence and remote technical support, etc.


Design and train in peace/normal mode as you need to operate in war/failure mode.

Alastair,


Sounds like a classic failure in the systems design thinking, less than rigorous risk management, perhaps an element of group think and not enough challenging within the team, a fundamental poor assumption that only one power ring system could never have a fault/failure (all systems fail), no power distribution redundancy, or a single point of failure, a weakness in the Fault Tree Analysis methodology, and perhaps some limited 'thinking the unthinkable'.


Could have been overcome, or minimised at least, with some robust, or better, Failure Mode, Effects & Criticality Analysis (FMECA) quantitative failure analysis. The FMECA involves creating a series of linkages between potential failures (Failure Modes), the impact on the mission (Effects) and the causes of the failure (Causes and Mechanisms) - some basic 'what if this fails or malfunctions' questioning of every element of a system hardware and software.


One could argue this lack of system fault analysis was why the Royal Navy Type 45 Destroyers had such an expensive and alongside period due to the well documented power/cooling/propulsion problem still being resolved. The more complex and too software reliant a design, the more vulnerable and likely to have failures and faults. Need to get back to the KISS (Keep It Simple and Safe) principle, especially to provide robust, basic failsafe, minimum functionality operating capability in high risk environments. 


Fortunately, in your scenario you had a chief engineer and technical team who could do proper engineering and fault circumvention. Unfortunately, as many organisations down-skill and rely more on out-sourcing of key engineering and technical skills, and greater reliance on HUMS and automated fault analysis and reporting systems, the basic engineering skills needed in these critical scenarios are rapidly fading and being lost with the retirement of the older workforce. Time for re-introduction second and third line engineering and maintenance skills, especially when operating in remote and isolated scenarios where it is impossible or difficult to bring in SMEs, or rely on robust tele-maintence and remote technical support, etc.


Design and train in peace/normal mode as you need to operate in war/failure mode.