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Are there lessons we could all learn from how the modern military copes with unexpected situations?

Hi,


A couple of serious issues I was involved with this weekend made me think of this. One was in the engineering world to do with the day job, I was reviewing a very serious incident report (fortunately no fatalities but very close) involving a mixture of everyone trying to do the best they could, but perhaps over reliant on structured checklists which had completely missed an entire piece of equipment in a fairly unique situation. The other was a medical issue in the family, once again all the individual hospital staff were doing their best, but there was a bit of the process that just didn't cope with a particular situation.


Which made me think of something that's long been at the back of my mind: I've never worked in a military environment, but my impression of the modern military from the contacts I have had is that there is still a very structured hierarchy, chain of command, and focus on process, but equally it appears that somehow there is also the ability for small units to have the skills and freedom to evaluate and make their own decisions when challenging circumstances arise - exactly the key skills that were missing in the two examples above. 


So really two questions I'd really like to know other people's views on (particularly those who have worked across both the military and civilian worlds): firstly are my impressions above correct? And if so (or even if a bit wrong but on the right lines) are there lessons we can learn from how this works that we can apply to the management of engineering activities in the wider world - particularly in safety critical issues where we need structure but also need the ability to rapidly and effectively cope with new problems when they come up?   


Thanks,


Andy
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  • I saw this come up on the E&T 'advert' inserts. I was in the OTC at university and a junior TA officer for a few years there after, before moving North where I worked in the defence industry (mainly Army & some Air Force equipments). My interests include systems thinking, human error and cognition.


    Here's a few points I'd noted about some of the differences between the civil and military approaches which make them not directly comparable for the learning about situations (aren't all 'situations' in some way unexpected?)


    1. Money is not an issue.

    2. Distinction between leadership (forces) and management (civilian) (e.g. the organisation has an independent conscience (NHS))

    3. Losses, though highly undesirable, are to be expected and planned for.

    4. Team mindset. (no work-life balance)

    5. Narrow minded mission.

    6. Overwhelming force (see also 1.), (rather than efficiency)

    7. Expertise in local equipment, often deep, rather than broad.

    8. Reliance on specialist equipment designed long ago for a differing purpose by lowest cost contractors for political reasons...

    9. Plenty of time practicing / doing 'nothing'.

    10. Monopsony / monopoly conundrums.

    11. Politically supported bunker mentality.

    12. System Thinkers, maybe. - Different system / Different environment.

    13. Focus on success vs focus on failure ?

    14. Development of the soldier vs being a production worker.

    15. A different perception of "Normal Accidents".

    16. Different perspectives within Navy, Air Force, Army.


    These differences will tend to push the military into a different quadrant of Quinn's Competing Values Framework (CVF) so that while normally adjacent, there are many aspects that veer into the conflicting values zones, just as most engineering companies have 'poor' HR function because of the value differences.


    Yes there is a lot to be learned, but one has to scratch below the surface to make sure that we are looking at similar environmental conditions and similar system foci.


    Philip

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  • I saw this come up on the E&T 'advert' inserts. I was in the OTC at university and a junior TA officer for a few years there after, before moving North where I worked in the defence industry (mainly Army & some Air Force equipments). My interests include systems thinking, human error and cognition.


    Here's a few points I'd noted about some of the differences between the civil and military approaches which make them not directly comparable for the learning about situations (aren't all 'situations' in some way unexpected?)


    1. Money is not an issue.

    2. Distinction between leadership (forces) and management (civilian) (e.g. the organisation has an independent conscience (NHS))

    3. Losses, though highly undesirable, are to be expected and planned for.

    4. Team mindset. (no work-life balance)

    5. Narrow minded mission.

    6. Overwhelming force (see also 1.), (rather than efficiency)

    7. Expertise in local equipment, often deep, rather than broad.

    8. Reliance on specialist equipment designed long ago for a differing purpose by lowest cost contractors for political reasons...

    9. Plenty of time practicing / doing 'nothing'.

    10. Monopsony / monopoly conundrums.

    11. Politically supported bunker mentality.

    12. System Thinkers, maybe. - Different system / Different environment.

    13. Focus on success vs focus on failure ?

    14. Development of the soldier vs being a production worker.

    15. A different perception of "Normal Accidents".

    16. Different perspectives within Navy, Air Force, Army.


    These differences will tend to push the military into a different quadrant of Quinn's Competing Values Framework (CVF) so that while normally adjacent, there are many aspects that veer into the conflicting values zones, just as most engineering companies have 'poor' HR function because of the value differences.


    Yes there is a lot to be learned, but one has to scratch below the surface to make sure that we are looking at similar environmental conditions and similar system foci.


    Philip

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