I second that it would be good to perhaps add something by way of definition

e.g.

Emergence concerns new properties produced as the system grows, which is to say ones which are not shared with its components when considered in isolation or in prior simpler states. Also, it must be assumed that some of the system properties are supervenient   that is to say interlinked in  way that a change in one thing is required for there to be a change in the other rather than metaphysically primitive, that  is to say indivisible and totally independent entities or  concepts.

That should do it...  Pillow and a mug of cocoa anyone ?

I think in the world of  engineering we worry about things known and discussed in the specialist vernacular as surprises, or unforeseen occurrences.

The art of allowing for these is the art of management of risk.

A chap called Rumsfeld had something pithy to say about unknown unknowns as well

A rewrite in plainspeak would help,  also as it seems that true (strong) emergence is incompatible with the laws of physics, so I cannot support it  ;-)

Mike.

mapj1 said:

as surprises, or unforeseen occurrences.

I'm currently working on a Canadian project which uses the North American military term "mishaps". To our UK ears it sounds highly entertaining to refer to the potential event where e.g. two trains collide with multiple fatalities as a "mishap" - "oh dear, what a pity, that was a bit of a mishap wasn't it, tut tut"! But then plenty of things we say sound strange to Canadian ears...

mapj1 said:

A chap called Rumsfeld had something pithy to say about unknown unknowns as well

Quite. I quote him a lot when assessing HAZIDs and what comes afterwards!

No worse than 'near miss' used locally to mean things that to the non-specialist sound like not even close to a "miss" at all..

To the man in the street a near miss is when a projectile ruffles your hair but does no injury, and is a serious  thing - as in a few inches removed from a fatality or life changing accident..

To some H and S types a near miss is an extension lead in the stock cupboard with an out-of date test label, or a cable that no one tripped over but perhaps they might have if anyone had walked there.

The problem is that 'erring on the safe side' can over-state very minor risks and  cheapens the language of the more serious things we should be looking at. 

This is in much the same way as the proliferation of warnings. "do not touch the blade" is a very sensible warning on a chainsaw, but to put an identical standard warning on a penknife immediately lowers the perceived risk of the chainsaw to the same level as the knife, which it really isn't.

Language matters, and must match the intended audience - and if, as the modern trend,  you have managers of the type who have an MBA but precious little knowledge of the nuts and volts of what they are managing, then it becomes really very important indeed .

Actually we have a great many special terms we use to describe when things go wrong with a great finesse of resolution of the severity of the problem, but these are not in the official lexicon. Sadly I think most of them would not survive the auto-censor, though I suspect many practical places of work are the same.

Mike

Andy, legalism and misrepresenting risk is a real problem.  Possibly the IET should somehow have a committee that advises lawyers????

Andy, legalism and misrepresenting risk is a real problem.  Possibly the IET should somehow have a committee that advises lawyers????

CliveS said:

legalism and misrepresenting risk is a real problem

I am not sure to what exactly you are referring. There are many conceptions of risk used in engineering (I introduced five in a recent talk). The IEC for many years tried to "harmonise" its various definitions of risk and has now acknowledged that it is a bigger issue than they thought.

The more knowledgeable law firms know how to get expert advice on engineering safety and reliability, and are usually very selective in how they engage experts. I don't really see a role for the IET there.

I think the problem here would be "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing". What the IET could do is to brief law firms with the outlines but then with the strict caveat that "this is only scratching the surface, actually to know whether enough risk assessment has been done you need to employ an expert to investigate that particular case" (i.e. as Peter says). But in practice I'd fully agree with Peter that I've never come across this as an issue; whenever I've been called in to help with a legal (or potentially legal) case, on either side of the fence, everyone involved has been pretty clear that they need expert help. I like working with lawyers because they leave us to get on with it!

The people who "don't know what they don't know" tend to come much earlier in the process, it's the engineering and project management teams, they're the ones who do need the information and support (including, conversely, about what their legal obligations are). Hence it's great that the IET are reaching out like this. Sort that out and companies don't need to worry about the lawyers anyway. 

By the way, a declaration of interest to be squeaky clean, I do deliver training and mentoring on this stuff, but that's very much a side part of my "real" job which is checking that engineering projects have done it properly. And I'm near enough to retirement age that I would be delighted if all engineering teams suddenly "got it" and I was left with no work to do!!! Just because the world would be a safer place. (My business managers won't like me saying this but: it is a wonderful feeling when you're working with a client and suddenly all their safety processes start working and they don't need you any more - makes it all worth while.) But equally I've no worries about, sadly, there being plenty of work in the real world to keep me going for many years to come. The principles of safety engineering are actually very easy, but truly embedding them in an organisation is blooming difficult.

Thanks,

Andy