Continued cost overruns for UK based infrastructure projects - Will we ever learn?

Sunday I sat reading the usual crop of the weeks papers and other magazines and journals as I relaxed during the morning and of the articles that I focused on I noticed a common theme emerging, that being the significant cost overruns on HS2 and also Sizewell C.  This led me to fire up the computer and after a couple of hours searching for Capital Cost Infrastructure Projects I was dismayed to have my thoughts confirmed that Project Cost forecasting is seldom accurate in many cases and the margin of error is astounding to the point that it suggests that the initial cost model that was submitted first for the Go/No Go Decision, and then Contract Placement is at best proven to be a fiction in many cases.  

For example, McKinsey reports that large projects typically overrun budgets by 80%, and Cycle Construction suggested nationwide overruns average 15-25%. These issues are not unique to the UK, with global statistics showing similar trends. 

Further examples of Project Failures include:

  • HS2: The high-speed rail project has faced significant cost increases and delays, making it one of the most expensive megaprojects in the UK.  The initial estimate was £56 billion, which has since ballooned to £106 billion, with potential further increases, according to Full Circle Continuous Improvement,. Factors contributing to this include rising land acquisition costs, complex engineering challenges, and environmental protests.  
  • Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route (AWPR): This Scottish road project experienced a significant cost increase from its initial budget. 
  • London Jubilee Line Extension: This project was significantly over budget and behind schedule. 
  • Scottish Parliament Building: Initially estimated at £10-40 million, the final cost reached £414 million due to a complex and frequently changing design, poor project management, and underestimation of the scope,
  • Channel Tunnel:
    While a vital link, the Channel Tunnel project suffered from significant cost overruns, with the final cost exceeding the initial estimate by 80%. The project also took longer to complete than anticipated. 
  • The Wembley Stadium Reconstruction: The project started with an initial budget of £326.5 million provided by Australian construction company Multiplex. However, the project ended up costing over £1 billion, making it one of the most expensive stadiums ever constructed.

I could continue to list many projects that I fear that the such a list would be exhaustive.

I therefore pose the question, do Project Cost Models provide any value at all when many cost overruns exceed 100%.  Are financial risk models adequate or even understood?  As professionals working in Project Cost and Control, how do we address these issues, and how do we truly measure the effectiveness of what we do as any such metric is only as good as the data and assumptions used?

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  • For example, McKinsey reports that large projects typically overrun budgets by 80%, and Cycle Construction suggested nationwide overruns average 15-25%. These issues are not unique to the UK, with global statistics showing similar trends.

    Cost overruns are universal, but the UK does appear to have a particular problem with very high costs, there's been a number of reports comparing major UK infrastructure projects to comparable European countries, particularly in industries like rail and transport, finding UK costs are substantially higher than competitor countries. There does seem to a problem in the UK with how we deliver these major projects, and obviously long term it's a big problem for any country if it cannot build infrastructure in an efficient way because a country falls into relative decline as its infrastructure falls behind, impacting competitiveness and quality of life. 

    It's the kind of topic where we really need the engineering institutions like the IET to get involved, what is it about the UK engineering and project landscape which is causing this lack of competitiveness?  What role does the way we engineer projects, the standards and regulations we follow and the costs they reasonably, or unreasonably or disproportionately impose, play in those poor outcomes?

    Also, wasn't there an article in the E&T magazine a while back about the London Olympic delivery project that did (per article, obviously) deliver on-time. Such are real DEAD-lines.

    It hit the dead-line, but it blew the budget, to put it mildly. Original estimate was £2 Billion, out-turn was around £9 Billion, so +350% !

    I saw it referenced in a good example of using historical actual project costs as a way of checking the reasonableness of project estimates, taking the actual costs for a number of previous Olympics, adjusting for inflation and exchange rates, them using it as a simple benchmark. The original £2 Bn estimate stood out like a sore-thumb, it was far below the actual costs of previous Olympics, obvious that it likely to be unrealistic. 

  • The original £2 Bn estimate stood out like a sore-thumb, it was far below the actual costs of previous Olympics, obvious that it likely to be unrealistic.

    That would appear to be part of our political [people] problem, which isn’t addressable by engineering alone.

    We like our cake, and we like eating it. (The wedding cake isn't the marriage ;-)

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  • The original £2 Bn estimate stood out like a sore-thumb, it was far below the actual costs of previous Olympics, obvious that it likely to be unrealistic.

    That would appear to be part of our political [people] problem, which isn’t addressable by engineering alone.

    We like our cake, and we like eating it. (The wedding cake isn't the marriage ;-)

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