I'm also only part way through the video so I might not have heard the fully story yet, but I must confess to some uneasiness...

It seems to me that the basic problem is that of 'abstract management' - i.e. those who decide if things are right or not (usually) don't actually understand the basic principles or details of the thing they're dealing with themselves, so can't exercise their own judgement about it - instead they rely on 3rd parties to supply all the necessary information and simply say it's OK if they are in possession of sufficient quantities of bit of paper (physical or electronic) which say "OK" on them. That would be all well and good if all the bits of paper had reliable information on them ... but clearly they don't. We've all seen enough 'drive-by' EICRs, or green PAT stickers on things with broken c.p.c.s. or completely fabricated CE certificcates from the Far East to know that's the case. Even bit of paper that are of themselves correct and accurage, they can get mis-interpreted because the abstract management technique doesn't require those in charge to understand the differences and subtleties between different products or situations. Like the "Qualified Electrician" and a 10kVA 3-phase UPS without a local means of Earthing  - turns out the qualifications where basically that of a Domestic Installer and he knew nothing about on-site generation - but it got the "qualified" box ticked.

As far as I can tell, everyone involved in Grenfell was in possession of bit of paper that said that their bit was OK. Any suggestions to the contrary could then be dismissed as there was "proof" that everything was satisfactory. Administrative procedure trumps common sense.

If the basic problem is blindly relying on bits of paper, I'm not that sure than introducing yet another layer of paper (whether certifying people or products) is a sure fire solution...

   - Andy.

I'm also only part way through the video so I might not have heard the fully story yet, but I must confess to some uneasiness...

It seems to me that the basic problem is that of 'abstract management' - i.e. those who decide if things are right or not (usually) don't actually understand the basic principles or details of the thing they're dealing with themselves, so can't exercise their own judgement about it - instead they rely on 3rd parties to supply all the necessary information and simply say it's OK if they are in possession of sufficient quantities of bit of paper (physical or electronic) which say "OK" on them. That would be all well and good if all the bits of paper had reliable information on them ... but clearly they don't. We've all seen enough 'drive-by' EICRs, or green PAT stickers on things with broken c.p.c.s. or completely fabricated CE certificcates from the Far East to know that's the case. Even bit of paper that are of themselves correct and accurage, they can get mis-interpreted because the abstract management technique doesn't require those in charge to understand the differences and subtleties between different products or situations. Like the "Qualified Electrician" and a 10kVA 3-phase UPS without a local means of Earthing  - turns out the qualifications where basically that of a Domestic Installer and he knew nothing about on-site generation - but it got the "qualified" box ticked.

As far as I can tell, everyone involved in Grenfell was in possession of bit of paper that said that their bit was OK. Any suggestions to the contrary could then be dismissed as there was "proof" that everything was satisfactory. Administrative procedure trumps common sense.

If the basic problem is blindly relying on bits of paper, I'm not that sure than introducing yet another layer of paper (whether certifying people or products) is a sure fire solution...

   - Andy.