Across the OT cyber security landscape, one issue has been repeatedly highlighted by industrial cyber researchers, government advisories and sector‑specific security groups: the rapid increase in connectivity between IT and OT systems is making industrial environments far more exposed than they were even a few years ago.
For decades, operational technology, PLCs, SCADA systems, HMIs, engineering workstations and industrial controllers, relied on physical isolation and purpose‑built networks. Today, that world has changed. Organisations in manufacturing, energy, transport and utilities have connected OT systems to enterprise IT networks to support analytics, remote monitoring, predictive maintenance and integration with cloud platforms. While this connectivity brings speed and efficiency, it also opens pathways that attackers are now exploiting with increasing precision.
Cyber attackers are no longer required to penetrate an industrial control system directly. Instead, they compromise an IT‑side asset, something as ordinary as a staff laptop, a VPN portal, a Windows server or a misconfigured remote access tool, and then pivot into OT networks. It is this IT‑to‑OT movement, enabled by connectivity, that is now the defining risk in industrial cyber security.
Why the Rise in Connectivity Is Accelerating Threats
The real issue is no longer just that industrial systems are more connected. It’s how they are connected, and what that means for attackers. Modern OT environments now rely on a web of interfaces that link operational systems with business analytics, cloud platforms, vendor support channels and remote engineering access. This expanded ecosystem creates multiple points where an attacker can gain an initial foothold, even if the OT network itself remains segmented. In practice, compromises often begin with routine IT‑side weaknesses such as compromised user accounts, vulnerable remote access tools or mismanaged third‑party connections. Once inside, attackers increasingly use automated discovery tools and protocol‑aware techniques to identify pathways into control networks.
Another challenge is that the connectivity layer often evolves faster than the security practices surrounding it. New sensors, gateways and digital services are added to improve operational insight, but they sometimes introduce exposure if configurations are rushed or if legacy devices sit behind modern interfaces without adequate protections. This dynamic environment makes it easier for attackers to move laterally, especially when support systems, engineering workstations or historian servers bridge the space between IT and OT.
Adding to this, the motivation behind attacks has shifted. Ransomware and extortion groups have realised that manipulating or disrupting physical processes delivers far greater leverage than traditional data theft. Instead of focusing solely on encrypting files, some attackers now aim for operational impact, interrupting production, forcing shutdowns or threatening process instability, because organisations are more likely to respond quickly when safety and continuity are at risk. As a result, any connectivity that links business networks to industrial systems has become a strategic target, turning previously low‑risk access points into high‑value opportunities for attackers.
The Misconfiguration Problem: A Silent but Major Risk
One of the most frequently cited issues across 2025–2026 OT incident reports is the sheer number of misconfigurations found in industrial environments. These aren’t sophisticated zero‑day exploits or novel attack techniques; they’re everyday oversights that build up quietly over years of system upgrades, contractor access and operational pressures. In many cases, OT networks remain flat and poorly segmented, making it far easier for attackers to move laterally once inside. Remote access connections are sometimes left enabled after maintenance windows, engineering workstations are occasionally found connected to corporate Wi‑Fi for convenience, and default credentials linger on devices that were never designed with modern authentication requirements in mind. Even basic logging is often disabled on HMIs and historians, meaning suspicious activity can go unnoticed for long periods.
These issues persist for a simple reason: OT environments prioritise uptime above all else. When equipment must remain continuously operational, even small configuration changes can feel risky, leading to a “don’t touch it unless absolutely necessary” culture. Threat actors understand this dynamic well, and many recent OT intrusions have succeeded not through advanced malware but by exploiting these long‑standing weaknesses. Misconfigurations may be mundane, but they now represent some of the most significant and preventable entry points into industrial control systems.
A Shift Toward OT-Specific Incident Response
A growing number of organisations are recognising that responding to an OT cyber incident is fundamentally different from responding to an IT breach. In OT, decisions must consider equipment protection, human safety, physical processes and operational continuity. This has led to a rising focus on building hybrid response teams that combine cyber analysts with control engineers who understand how the process behaves under stress.
This trend reflects a deeper understanding that OT security is not simply “IT security applied to industrial networks.” It requires domain awareness, operational insight and careful coordination to avoid turning a cyber incident into an operational failure.
Key Learning Point
The most important development in OT cyber security today is not the sophistication of attacks but the increased exposure created by connectivity. As IT and OT systems become more tightly integrated, industrial environments face new risks that neither traditional IT security nor legacy OT practices can manage alone. The organisations making the most progress are those treating OT cyber security as its own discipline, one that requires engineering knowledge, cyber expertise and an understanding of modern operational realities.
More Information
To support teams building these capabilities, the IET offers its Foundations and Practice in OT Cyber Security course, which provides a structured, practical introduction to securing industrial and control systems: https://www.theiet.org/career/training-courses/foundations-and-practice-in-ot-cyber-security.