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Retrofitting Legacy Control Systems to Tackle Evolving OT Cyber Threats

Taimur

Hi everyone,

I’m new to the EngX community and looking forward to learning from you all. I’d like to start a conversation about something I think many of us face and that is updating legacy control systems in power plants and other critical infrastructure, especially when it comes to growing OT cyber threats.

Lot of these systems were designed decades ago, with reliability in mind but little thought given to cybersecurity. Today, they’re exposed to new risks that weren’t imagined back then. The challenge is finding a way to retrofit these systems efficiently and without tearing everything apart or causing long periods of downtime.

In the UK, where our energy and infrastructure systems are heavily relied upon, even a small disruption can create big problems. So how do we make these updates both secure and practical?

I’m particularly interested in hearing how others have approached efficient retrofitting and what worked, what didn’t, and how you balanced the iron triangle of cost, time, quality and scope. Are there certain strategies or tools that helped modernize your systems without overhauling them completely.

Would love to hear your thoughts and experiences.

Thanks,

Taimur | MIET 

Parents

  • If it were up to me I would seriously consider banning all microprocessor relays from swtichgear feeding critical infrastructure - or at least mandate a electromagnetic back-up relays.

    Anything that contains a microchip is subject to supply chain attacks. For example, imagine a hidden backdoor in the chip that renders it inoperable after x years of use etc. etc. If this were to be installed without detection it could cause total chaos given the highly centralized supply of such devices.

    We are constantly being told by our own government that our threat model should include state actors. State actors are more than capable of inserting hardware back doors into devices.

    The fact is that older simpler control systems - particularly if air-gaped - have a much smaller attack surface and are therefore much more resilient to cyber threats.

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  • If it were up to me I would seriously consider banning all microprocessor relays from swtichgear feeding critical infrastructure - or at least mandate a electromagnetic back-up relays.

    Anything that contains a microchip is subject to supply chain attacks. For example, imagine a hidden backdoor in the chip that renders it inoperable after x years of use etc. etc. If this were to be installed without detection it could cause total chaos given the highly centralized supply of such devices.

    We are constantly being told by our own government that our threat model should include state actors. State actors are more than capable of inserting hardware back doors into devices.

    The fact is that older simpler control systems - particularly if air-gaped - have a much smaller attack surface and are therefore much more resilient to cyber threats.

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